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 ABSTRACT 
Investments in Electricity Generating Capacity under Different Market 
Structures and with Endogenously Fixed Demand 
by Anette Boom* 
Investments in Generating Capacities between a monopolist and two competing 
firms are compared where the firms invest in their capacity and fix the retail 
price while electricity demand is uncertain. A unit price auction determines the 
wholesale electricity price when the firms compete. They know the level of 
demand when they bid their capacities. Total capacities can be larger or smaller 
with a duopoly than with a monopoly. If the two firms co-ordinate on a pareto 
dominant equilibrium, then the retail price is always higher and the social 
welfare lower in the competitive case, which exists only if capacity costs are not 
too high. 
 
Keywords: Electricity Markets, Investments, Generating Capacities, Monopoly, 
Competition 
JEL Classification: D42, D43, D44, L11, L12, L13 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Investitionen in Stromerzeugungskapazität bei verschiedenen 
Marktstrukturen und endogen fixierter Nachfrage 
Die Investitionen in Stromerzeugungskapazität von einem Monopolisten werden 
mit denen zweier konkurrierender Unternehmen verglichen. Dabei investieren 
die Unternehmen in ihre Kapazität und setzen ihren Einzelhandelspreis, bevor 
sich die unsichere Nachfrage realisiert hat. Im Falle konkurrierender Firmen 
bestimmt sich der Großhandelspreis in einer nicht-diskriminierenden Auktion. 
Die Unternehmen kennen die Nachfragerealisation, wenn sie dort Ihre Gebote 
abgeben. Die Gesamtkapazität im Duopol kann sowohl größer als auch kleiner 
sein als im Monopol. Falls die zwei Unternehmen sich jedoch auf ein 
paretodominantes Gleichgewicht koordinieren, dann ist der Einzelhandelspreis 
immer höher und die soziale Wohlfahrt immer niedriger im 
Wettbewerbsgleichgewicht als im Monopol, wobei ersteres nur bei relativ 
geringen Kapazitätskosten existiert. 
                                                 
*  I thank Christian Wey and Christopher Xitco for their helpful  comments. 
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  Introduction
In many industrialised countries the market for electricity has been liber
alised Until the end of the eighties there was almost no competition among
electricity suppliers The market was characterised by regional monopolies
that were either private enterprises  which had to comply with some kind
of price regulation  or public utilities The Electricity Pool of England and
Wales and the socalled North Pool of the Scandinavian countries were the
rst attempts to organise a market for electricity and to introduce competi
tion into the electricity industry Other countries followed
Whereas the introduction of competition was rather successful in these two
regions  others  like California and New Zealand  experienced major crises
with an explosion of wholesale prices and blackouts
 
The focus of this paper
is  however  not to gure out what went wrong when California and New
Zealand opened their markets for competition 

but rather to investigate 
whether the incentives to invest in generating capacity can be suboptimal
under competition compared to a monopoly market
Why should this be the case	 The electricity market like many other markets
is characterised by an uncertain demand Electricity can  however  usually
not be stored All competing rms must use the same distribution network 
and the in
ows and out
ows of electricity into this network have to be bal
anced at each point in time If the balance cannot be preserved  then the
network collapses and none of the rms can sell electricity anymore This
creates externalities that might be better internalised by a monopolist than
by competing rms The monopolist might install larger generating capac
ities  because he cannot freeride on the capacity investments of others In
addition he can realise higher returns on his capacities in the rare cases of
a high demand He tends  however  to produce less than is socially ecient
and would therefore need and build fewer generating capacities
There are some indications that competing generators underinvest in their
generating capacity as long as competition is not perfect Von der Fehr
and Harbord  as well as CastroRodriguez et al  show that
from a social welfare point of view rms would build suboptimal low levels of
generating capacity  if the industry price coincides with their marginal cost of
generating electricity  when the industrys capacities are sucient to satisfy
demand at this price  and with the market clearing price otherwise By
 
See e g  The Economist from March   p   and from February  	 and
for the latest crisis in New Zealand Modern Power Systems from August 	 p   

For analyses of the Californian electricity crisis see e g  Joskow 
	 Borenstein
et al  
	 Borenstein 
		 and Wilson 
		 

choosing suboptimal low levels of capacities rms can secure higher revenues
in case of high demand realisations The ineciency disappears only if the
number of rms approaches innity

They also prove that rms invest more
in their generating capacity  if the spot market price exceeds marginal costs
at a xed margin In addition von der Fehr and Harbord  endogenise
the spot market price of electricity for an inelastic demand that is ex ante
uncertain in the capacity decision stage  and known  when the rms bid for
the possibility to supply electricity in the auction The auction is a unit price
auction  la von der Fehr and Harbord  They conclude that the rms
underinvest in capacity as long as the distribution of the uncertain inelastic
demand is concave  meaning skewed to the lower end of the distribution But
neither of the two compares the market outcome under competition with the
one generated by a monopoly
Contrary to von der Fehr and Harbord   we consider consumers with
an elastic demand for electricity They can  however  not instantaneously
respond to price signals In the rst stage two rms invest in generating
capacity Then each rm oers the consumers a contract that guarantees
them a certain retail price and the delivery of electricity as long as deliv
ery is possible The consumers accept the contract with the lowest price
Afterwards nature chooses the level of the demand shock After observing
demand  rms bid prices in the wholesale market in order to get the right to
deliver the electricity they can generate with their capacity to the network
The wholesale market is modelled as a unit price auction  la von der Fehr
and Harbord  and 

Although there is a controversial debate
whether a discriminatory auction should be preferred to a uniform auction
design  most of the existing electricity markets are still uniform auctions

Since the two rms commit to retail prices before the auction takes place  de
mand is inelastic in the auction as in von der Fehr and Harbord  It is 
however  not exogenous as in their framework  but endogenously determined
by a competition for consumers in the retail market
The fact that consumers cannot instantaneously respond to price signals is
due to the imperfect metering technology that is used by most customers

This conrms the result of Borenstein and Holland 
		 who prove eciency for
perfectly competitive wholesale markets for electricity with price responsive demand 

An alternative approach in order to model unit price auctions has been suggested by
Green and Newbery 
	  It is based on Klemperer and Meyer 
  They assume
that rms bid dierentiable supply functions whereas von der Fehr and Harbord 

and 
 assume that they bid step functions 

An exception is the British market where a discriminatory auction has been introduced
with the New Electricity Trading Arrangements in 	  For a comparison of a uniform
versus a discriminatory versus a Vickrey auction design see Fabra et al  
		

This technology does not register how much electricity they consume at a
given point in time  and cannot communicate current market prices In a
companion paper Boom   I abstract from this problem and assume that
consumers can instantaneously respond to market prices and can therefore
directly participate in the spot market for electricity Both papers were
inspired by the proponents of a better metering technology who argue that
such a technology would result in much more elastic demands  reduce peak
demands and improve the performance of liberalised electricity markets see
Borenstein   Faruqui et al   For perfectly competitive electricity
markets with perfectly price responsive demand they can even show that
rms install the socially ecient levels of generating capacities Borenstein
and Holland   Most of the existing electricity markets are  however 
not characterised by perfect competition Therefore we analyse here a market
with an oligopolistic structure
It turns out that without a sophisticated metering technology the monopolist
might install a smaller or larger capacity than the two competitors together
at not too high of a capacity cost If we focus  however  on subgame per
fect Nash equilibria that are not pareto dominated  then the two duopoly
rms invest more than the monopolist The social welfare is  nevertheless 
always higher under a monopoly than in the competitive setting  because the
monopoly price is always lower than the duopoly price These results con
trast with those of the companion paper  Boom   where the monopoly
nearly always invests less and where the social welfare is always improved by
competition
 The Model
There are two generators of electricity j   A B  and a mass of electricity
consumers that is normalised to one They suer from demand shocks and
have a quasilinear utility function Let their surplus function be given by
V x   r   Ux    rx   x   
x  
 

  rx  
where x is the consumed electricity  r is the retail price paid per unit for
electricity  and  is the demand shock It hits all the consumers alike and is
uniformly distributed on the interval    The demand for electricity can
be derived from maximising V x   r with respect to x and results in
xr     maxf 	   r  g 

Note that the single consumers demand has no weight in the total demand
Thus  he cannot in
uence the balance of supply and demand on the grid and
would therefore always accept the lowest retail price oered If the oered
retail prices are identical  he then chooses each of the two price oers with
equal probability
The variable costs of generating electricity is assumed to be constant and 
for the sake of simplicity  equal to zero for both rms Thus the costs of rm
j consist only of the costs of capacity which are assumed to be
Ck
j
   zk
j
  
where z is a constant unit cost of capacity and k
j
the generation capacity
installed by rm j Firms decide on their capacity k
j
and on their retail
price oer r
j
before they know the level of demand When they bid their
capacity in the electricity wholesale market  the demand shock is already
realised and the retail price is already determined Therefore the market
demand is known for sure and does not respond to changes in the wholesale
price
The wholesale market price of electricity is determined in a unit price auction
of the type introduced by von der Fehr and Harbord  and  Such
an auction was at the heart of the Electricity Pool in England and Wales
before the reform in   and still is in place in other liberalised markets
like  eg  the Nord Pool in Scandinavia or the Spanish wholesale market


Firms have to bid a price p
j
at which they are willing to supply their whole
generating capacity For the sake of simplicity the rms cannot bid other
quantities

The auctioneer must secure the balance of supply and demand
on the grid if possible

Therefore he orders the bids according to their prices
and determines the marginal bid that is just necessary to equal supply and
demand The price of the marginal bid is the spot market price that is payed
to all the generators for each unit that is dispatched on the grid no matter
whether they bid a lower price

The capacity of the supplier that has bid a

See Bergman et al  
 

Thus we do not consider the problem of strategic withholding of capacity in order to
raise the auction price  See Crampes and Creti 
	 for such an analysis 

Transmission constraints are not considered here although they might interact with
constraints in the generating capacity  See Wilson 
		 for insights into this problem
and for the analysis of isolated transmission constraints Borenstein et al  
	 Joskow
and Tirole 
	 and Lautier 
	

This diers the analysis here from simple Bertrand competition as in Kreps and
Scheinkman 
 where the undercutting rm receives only its own price per unit sold
even if its capacity is too low to serve all the customers and some of them have to pay the
price of the competitor with the next highest price 

price below the marginal price is dispatched completely  whereas the marginal
supplier is only allowed to deliver that amount of electricity necessary to
balance supply and demand If the supplied capacity at a certain bid price
is insucient to satisfy demand but would be more than sucient to satisfy
demand at the next highest bid price  then the auctioneer sets the price in
between the two bid prices at that level that ensures the balance
 	
Since in our framework demand does not respond to changes in the wholesale
price and since the total amount of installed capacities can also not be in
u
enced by the wholesale price  the auctioneer may also fail to nd a price that
balances supply and demand in the market Then a blackout occurs No
rm can sell and deliver electricity  and all the rms realise zero prots If
total capacities are sucient to satisfy demand  the auctioneer accepts only
price oers that do not exceed the maximum price level 
p that ensures zero
prots for the buyer in the auction
The game proceeds as follows
 The two generating rms simultaneously choose their respective capac
ities k
A
and k
B

 The rms simultaneously oer contracts to the consumers that specify
a retail price r
A
or r
B
  respectively The consumers sign the contract
with the lowest price or  sign each contract with probability one half 
if both prices are identical
 Nature determines the demand shock 
 Both rms bid a price p
j
for their whole capacity k
j
in the wholesale
market
 The auctioneer determines the market clearing price p  if this is pos
sible  and which generator is allowed to deliver which amount of elec
tricity to the grid
 If supply and demand cannot be balanced  a blackout occurs The
consumers are not served and do not pay anything to the generators
If the balance on the wholesale market can be achieved  the consumers
are served and pay the contracted retail price for each unit of their
demand to the rm with which they signed the contract The rms
have to pay the wholesale price for each unit of electricity that their
 	
According to Wilson 
		 we assume an integrated system because participation in
the auction is compulsory if a generating rm wants to sell electricity 

contracted consumers required and receive the wholesale price for each
unit of electricity that they were allowed to dispatch on the grid
It is assumed that the two rms can coordinate on a pareto dominant Nash
equilibrium if there are multiple Nash equilibria in one of the stages
 The Monopolists Capacity Choice
As a benchmark case we analyse how much a monopolist would invest in
generation capacity  if he had to choose his capacity and to x his retail price
r before the uncertainty of demand is resolved Note that with a monopolist
a wholesale market does not exist The monopolists prot function is given
by

m
r  k  
 
















R

maxfr  g
r 	   rd  zk if r    k 
R
k r
maxfr  g
r 	   rd  zk if maxf    kg
 r    k 
 zk if r  maxf    kg

By dierentiating the monopolists prot function  with respect to r the
optimal retail price for a given generation capacity can be calculated and is
characterised in lemma 
Lemma  For a given generation capacity k the monopolists prot max 
imising retail price is r

k with
r

k   max



    k


Proof  See appendix A
The monopolist sets a price that coincides with the unrestricted monopoly
price of the expected demand  as long as his generation capacity is large
enough k 


 to satisfy even the largest possible demand at this price
For lower generation capacities   k 


 the retail price decreases in the
generation capacity The monopolist sets a price that ensures no electricity
outages for all possible demand shocks  Therefore blackouts would never
occur under the scenario considered here

Substituting the optimal price from Lemma  into the monopolists prot
function   dierentiating with respect to k  and setting it equal to zero
yields the monopolists capacity choice  which is given in proposition 
Proposition  The monopolist chooses the generation capacity
k

m
 
 






 
z
 
if z 

 
 
 if z 

 

The retail price in equilibrium is
r

m
 


	
z

 
as long as the investment in generation capacity is positive ie z 

 

Proof  See appendix A
The monopolists investment decreases in the capacity cost z  but is dis
continuous at z  

 
because even optimal capacity levels and an optimal
retail price would result in negative prots The retail price increases in the
capacity cost z
 Investments in Generation Capacity with Two
Competing Firms
  The Wholesale Market
If two rms compete  a wholesale market exists Both rms commit in an
earlier stage to a retail price In addition the demand shock  can already be
observed by all market participants  therefore total market demand is xed
and known to be
dr
A
  r
B
     x minfr
A
  r
B
g   
The contracted demand of rm j is given by
d
j
r
j
  r
h
    
 




xr
j
   if r
j
 r
h
 

 
xr
j
   if r
j
  r
h
 
 if r
j
 r
h
 
with j  h  fA Bg  j   h 

In principle we can distinguish two dierent situations First  total capac
ity might be smaller than the market demand dr
j
  r
h
    k
j
	 k
h
  in
which case the auctioneer would not nd any auction price that balances
demand and supply and there would be a blackout rms prots would be
f
j
p
j
  p
h
  r
j
  r
h
      Note that the investments in generation capacity are
sunk at this stage Second  if total capacity is sucient to serve the market
demand dr
j
  r
h
    k
j
	 k
h
  then the auction price is
pp
j
  p
h
    

p
j
if dr
j
  r
h
    k
h
 
p
h
if dr
j
  r
h
    k
h
 

and p
j
 p
h
  
and the auctioneer dispatches the generating capacities of the two rms ac
cording to their price bids The quantity of electricity that rm j is allowed
to transmit to the network is given by
y
j
p
j
  p
h
    
 














minfk
j
  dr
j
  r
h
  g if p
j
 p
h
 

 
minfk
j
  dr
j
  r
h
  g
	

 
maxfdr
j
  r
h
    k
h
  g if p
j
  p
h
 
maxfdr
j
  r
h
    k
h
  g if p
j
 p
h


Thus  rm js prot in terms of its own bid price p
j
and its rivals bid price
p
h
is
f
j
p
j
  p
h
  r
j
  r
h
     r
j
d
j
r
j
  r
h
   	 pp
j
  p
h
  y
j
p
j
  p
h
    d
j
r
j
  r
h
  
Note that y
j
p
j
  p
h
  	 y
h
p
j
  p
h
     d
j
r
j
  r
h
  	 d
h
r
j
  r
h
     dr
j
  r
h
  
must hold The analysis of the rms best responses in bid prices is presented
in detail in appendix B and results in the following lemma
Lemma  If both rms have installed enough generation capacity to satisfy
their own contracted demand k
j
 d
j
r
j
  r
h
 for j   A B then the bid prices
and the auction price satisfy p
A
  p
B
  pp
A
  p
B
      and each rms
prot net of capacity costs in equilibrium is f
j
r
j
  r
h
     r
j
d
j
r
j
  r
h
  
for j   A B If the total capacities installed are sucient to satisfy the
market demand k
A
	 k
B
 dr
j
  r
h
   but if one rm j cannot serve
its own contracted demand k
j
 d
j
r
j
  r
h
 then the bid prices satisfy
p
h
  
pr
j
  r
h
     pp
j
  p
h
   and p
j
 pr
j
  r
h
    
pr
j
  r
h
   with

pr
j
  r
h
    
r
j
d
j
r
j
  r
h
  
d
j
r
j
  r
h
    k
j
and

pr
j
  r
h
    
r
j
d
j
r
j
  r
h
  
minfk
h
  dr
j
  r
h
  g   d
h
r
j
  r
h
  

Prots are f
j
r
j
  r
h
      and f
h
r
j
  r
h
     r
j
d
j
r
j
  r
h
   	 r
h
d
h
r
j
  r
h
  
Proof  See appendix B
Given that both rms can serve their contracted demand  each rm prefers
to undercut its rival during the auction  because no rm wants to become
a net payer Thus  the Nash equilibrium is a zero auction price and each
rms prot is limited to the revenues earned from its contracted demand
Now consider a situation where one rm cannot serve its own contracted
demand  and the other cannot only serve its own contracted demand  but
can also make up for its rivals decit The decit rm cannot avoid becoming
a net payer during the auction It can  however  minimize its net demand
position by undercutting The rm with the generation surplus is always a
net supplier of electricity here The unique Nash equilibrium in this situation
is characterised by the surplus rm always bidding the maximum price The
decit rm undercuts suciently  so that the surplus rm has no incentive
to undercut itself The decit rm cannot realise a positive prot anymore 
whereas the surplus rm can appropriate all the markets rents
  The Retail Price Competition
In principle the rms can use three strategies in the retail price competition
They can undercut their rival and contract the whole  yet uncertain  demand
see equation  They can oer the same retail price as their rival  thus
contracting half of the market demand  or they can request a higher price
without contracting any demand Undercutting yields the following expected
prot

j
r
j
  r
h
  
 




R
minf k
j
r
j
 g
maxf r
j
 g
r
j
xr
j
  d if maxf  k
j
  g  r
j
 r
h
 
 if   r
j
 minf  k
j
  r
h
g

Firm j can only realise positive prots if the demand shock is  on the one
hand small enough that it can serve its own contracted demand  and  on the
other hand  large enough that the market demand is positive
If rm j sets the same retail price as its rival  then its expected prot depends
on the relative capacities of the two rms If the considered rm j has a
smaller capacity than its rival  the structure of its expected prot is the

same as in the undercutting case  except that the rm realises only half of
the market demand

j
r
j
  r
h



r
j
r
h
 
 








R
minf  k
j
r
h
 g
maxf r
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for k
j
 k
h
 If rm j has  however  a larger capacity than rm h  it can
appropriate all the rents in the market  if rm h is not able to serve its
contracted demand and if rm js surplus of capacity above its contracted
demand makes up for rm hs decit For k
j
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h
the expected prot is
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If rm j sets a higher retail price than its rival  it has no contracted demand
It can  however  earn positive revenues when its rival cannot serve its con
tracted demand at its price r
h
and rm js capacity is large enough to step
in Then rm j can appropriate the whole rent via the auction Thus  the
expected prot is

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From the analysis of the rms prot functions one can derive each rms best
response in retail prices This is done in appendix C in detail If the sum of
both rms generation capacities is rather large  both rms will always want
to undercut each other as in the usual Bertrand competition without any
capacity constraints and strategic considerations concerning the wholesale
market The resulting Nash equilibrium is r
h
  r
j
   and yields zero prots
for both rms
If the aggregate generation capacity in the market is smaller  one can dis
tinguish the symmetric case with k
A
  k
B
and the asymmetric case with
k
A
  k
B
 Let us rst consider the asymmetric  but not too asymmetric case
with k
j
 k
h
and k
h

k
j
 
 
 Then the best response of rm j with the
larger capacity would be characterised by undercutting as long as r
h
 r
It is characterised by r
j
 r
h
for maxf     k
h
g  r
h
 r  by r
j
 r
h
for maxf     k
h
  k
j
g  r
h
 maxf     k
h
g  and by indierence for
  r
h
    k
h
  k
j
  because rm js prot is then zero no matter which
retail price it chooses Firm h with the smaller capacity undercuts if r
j
 r

j
 
and chooses the same price as the larger provider j if r

j
 r
j
 r

j
 It sets
r
h
 r
j
if maxf     k
j
  k
h
g  r
j
 r

j
and is indierent because of zero
prots for r
j
   or   r
j
   k
j
  k
h
 The critical retail prices r  r

j
and
r

j
depend on the two rms capacity levels and are dened in appendix C
One can show  however  that r

j
 r  r

j
always holds The Nash equilib
rium is again r
h
  r
j
   for k
h
	 k
j
  and r
h
    k
h
  k
j
as well as
r
j
   k
h
  k
j
for k
h
	 k
j
  In both cases the rms realise zero prots
Now consider the very asymmetric case with k
h

k
j
 
 
 Firm j can still
serve the whole market for any possible demand shock  at prices where rm
h cannot even serve half of the market when they split the market at r
h
  r
j

Again rm h undercuts if r
j
 r

j
  it sets r
h
  r
j
  if    k
h
 r
j
 r

j
 
and it is indierent between undercutting  setting r
h
  r
j
and r
h
 r
j
  if
   k
j
 r
j
    k
h
  because rm h would realise zero prots anyway

For   r
j
    k
j
rm h sets r
h
 r
j
and can earn positive prots again 
because rm j is no longer able to serve any demand possible For r
j
  
rm h is indierent between all r
h
   because prots are again zero Firm
js best response does not change in principle The Nash equilibrium with
r
h
  r
j
   still exists  but there are other Nash equilibria where rm
h realises zero and rm j positive prots In these equilibria rm j sets
r
j
   k
j
    k
h
  where rm h realises zero prots no matter which price
it sets  and rm h undercuts or sets r
h
 r
j
if r
j
  maxf    k
j
g The
results for asymmetric generation capacities of the two rms are summarised
in the following lemma
Lemma  If the two rms di	er in their generation capacity k
A
  k
B

then there are no Nash equilibria in retail prices where both rms realise
positive prots The Nash equilibrium in retail prices with r

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  r

B
  
always exists For k
A
	 k
B
  there are also multiple Nash equilibria with
r
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
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    k
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B
 All these equilibria result in zero
prots for both rms
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For k
A
  k
B
there are no other Nash equilibria in retail prices
Proof  See appendix C 
If the two rms are symmetric in their generation capacities k
A
  k
B
 and
the capacities are not too large  both rms undercut  as long as the rivals
price exceeds r When the rival sets its price at r  each rm is indierent
between setting a higher price and the same price as the rival If the rivals
price is below r  but not smaller than   k
A
  k
B
  then both rms want to
set a higher price than their rival If the rival sets a retail price of zero or
a price below    k
A
  k
B
  then the considered rm is indierent between
undercutting  setting a higher or the same price  because all three options
result in zero prots Thus  the same Nash equilibrium or equilibria exists
as in the asymmetric case with zero equilibrium prots In addition there

is a Nash equilibrium with r
A
  r
B
  r  maxf     k
A
  k
B
g  where
both rms realise positive prots in equilibrium Our results concerning
the competition in retail prices with symmetric generation capacities are
summarised in lemma 
Lemma  If the two rms have the same generation capacity k
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then there is always a Nash equilibrium in retail prices with r
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Proof  See appendix C 
In the following section we assume that the two rms are able to coordinate
for given capacities on the equilibrium that pareto dominates all the other
possible Nash equilibria in retail prices If both rms choose symmetric
capacities with k
A
  k
B
  k 
p
  the pareto dominant Nash equilibrium
results in the retail prices r

A
  r

B
  given in Lemma  With asymmetric
capacities and k
h
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 
 
 

	
o
the pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is
characterised by r
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  maxf     k
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g  r
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 If the two rms capacities
satisfy

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  then the retail prices r

h
  r
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j
    k
h
are set in the
pareto dominant Nash equilibrium
  The Firms Investments in Generation Capacity
The rms anticipate the resulting retail prices and the prices on the wholesale
market when they decide on their generation capacities For a very low
capacity of its rival  a rm can either choose a very large capacity and ensure
itself monopoly revenues  or at least restricted monopoly revenues  or it can

choose the same small generation capacity as its rival in order to generate
positive revenues Firm js prot is
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for   k
h


	
 If the rivals capacity is larger  but still small  the rm can no
longer earn monopoly revenues  but for some small levels of k
h
  still positive
revenues  if it invests in a very much larger capacity than its rival Its prot
is
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 If the rival chooses intermediate levels of capacities  rm
js revenues from investing in the same level of capacity changes Firm js
prot is
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 If the rms rival chooses very large capacities  then rm
j can no longer earn positive revenues independent of its own capacity level

Firm js prot is
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for k
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 
 From these prot functions one can derive each rms best
response function in generation capacity and the resulting subgame perfect
Nash equilibria This is done in detail in appendix D Since both rms are
symmetric  the best response functions for the two rms are also symmetric
and depend on the level of the capacity costs z For very low levels of the
rivals capacity k
h
rm j can always monopolize the market by choosing the
same capacity as the monopolist This is always the best response as long as
the capacity cost is low enough to ensure a positive monopoly prot If the
rivals capacity increases  then rm j can still monopolize the market  but
must increase its own capacity beyond the optimal monopoly level Thus 
rm js prot from monopolization decreases when the rival capacity in
creases Therefore it is optimal for rm j to reduce its capacity dramatically
at a certain threshold of the rivals capacity k
h
and to switch either to a
symmetric capacity choice  where both rms share the market  or to zero ca
pacity when monopolization as well as sharing yields zero prots Depending
on the level of the capacity costs z  rm js best response to higher levels of
the rivals capacity k
h
is either to install no capacity or to choose the same
capacity and to share the market For very large capacities of the rival it
is always optimal for rm j to install no capacity The best responses of
the two rms and the resulting Nash equilibria are depicted in gure  for
dierent levels of capacity costs 
From gure  it is obvious that there are multiple subgame perfect Nash
equilibria in which the rms choose identical capacities and share the market
at low levels of capacity costs For intermediate levels of capacity costs there
are still multiple Nash equilibria where the rms choose identical capacities
In addition there are  however  two equilibria where one of the two rms
chooses the monopoly capacity and the other does not invest This happens 
if capacity costs are so high that the prots from sharing the market  when
each rm chooses the monopoly level of capacity  is negative For high levels
of capacity costs the sharing equilibria vanish  because choosing the same
capacity and sharing the market yields always negative prots Only the two
subgame perfect Nash equilibria  where one rm monopolizes the market 
do still exist They disappear when the capacity costs are so high that
even a monopolist can not generate positive prots in expectation Our
results concerning the investments of the two competing rms in generation

capacities are summarised in proposition   where we use
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which denes the capacity where the necessary capacity to monopolize is as
protable as choosing an identical capacity as ones rival
Proposition  In the subgame perfect Nash equilibria the two competing
rms choose identical generation capacities with
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is dened in proposition 
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both rms do not invest in generation capacity in equilibrium The
retail price in the equilibria with identical positive capacities is
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Whereas the retail price coincides with the monopoly price r

m
 given in propo 
sition 
 if the rms choose asymmetric capacities in equilibrium such that
one rm monopolizes the market
Proof  See Appendix D
Note that regardless of whether the rms play a competitive equilibrium
with k
A
  k
B
 minf

k  kg 


k or a monopoly equilibrium  no blackouts
occur independent of the demand shock 
In the following we focus mainly on subgame perfect equilibria  which are
not dominated by other equilibria By comparing each rms prots in the
dierent equilibria described in proposition  one can conclude
Corollary  If the capacity cost satises   z   then there is a
unique pareto dominant subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where both rms
choose

k which is dened in 
 For   z 

 
p
 
the subgame
perfect equilibria that are not pareto dominated are either characterised by
both rms choosing

k or by one rm choosing k

m
and the other installing
zero capacities If

 
p
 
 z 

 
holds then there are two equilibria which
are not pareto dominated with one rm choosing k

m
and the other installing
zero capacities For z 

 
there exists only one equilibrium where both rms
do not invest in capacities
The capacity

k is the capacity that maximises each rms prot  if both rms
choose the same level of capacity
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For intermediate levels of capacity costs the equilibrium with k
A
  k
B
 

k pareto dominates all the other competitive equilibria with k
A
  k
B

minf

k  kg 


k  but not the two monopoly equilibria with k
A
  k

m
and k
B
  
and k
B
  k

m
and k
A
    because the monopolist in the monopoly equilib
rium realises always higher prots than each single rm in the competitive
equilibrium In addition the monopoly equilibria do  as well  not pareto
dominate the competitive equilibrium with k
A
  k
B
 

k  because the rm
without any generation capacity has zero prots  whereas it realises positive
prots in the competitive equilibrium with k
A
  k
B
 

k Thus  even if we
consider only pareto dominant subgame perfect Nash equilibria  uniqueness
cannot be achieved

 Comparison of the Monopoly with the Duopoly
In Figure  the total capacities in the monopoly and duopoly cases are de
lineated The limits of the total capacities in the competitive equilibria  as
well as the total capacity in the pareto dominant competitive equilibrium and
the total capacity in the monopolistic equilibrium in the duopoly case are
painted in blue The capacity installed in the monopoly case is characterised
by a red line It is obvious that together the duopolists might invest more
or less than the monopolist If we assume  however  that the two rms can
coordinate on a subgame perfect equilibrium  which is not pareto dominated
then we arrive at proposition 
Proposition  If the two rms in the duopoly case can always co ordinate
on a subgame perfect equilibrium which is not pareto dominated by an other
one then the total capacity in the duopoly case exceeds the installed capacity
of a monopolist for capacity costs that satisfy   z   It is the same
or larger for   z 

 
p
 
 and it is the same for z 

 
p
 

Proof  The statement follows from 

k  k

m
for all   z 

 
p
 

Proposition  seems to conrm common wisdom that oligopolistic rms want
to produce more and would  therefore  also install more capacity If we
compare  however  the prices in equilibrium for those subgame perfect Nash
equilibria that are not pareto dominated  proposition  can then be derived
Proposition  If the two rms in the duopoly case can always co ordinate
on a subgame perfect equilibrium that is not pareto dominated by an other
equilibrium then the retail price in the duopoly case exceeds the retail price
of the monopolist for capacity costs that satisfy   z   The retail
price is the same or higher for   z 

 
p
 
 and it is the same for
z 

 
p
 

Proof  The statement follows from substituting

k into r

d
from proposition
 and comparing it with r

m
from proposition 
Proposition  contradicts the common view that oligopolistic rms want to
produce more and would therefore install larger capacities Since the two
rms would always set a higher retail price in the competitive equilibrium
than a monopolist  consumers would always consume less than in the monop
olistic case Thus  the higher level of installed capacities in the competitive
equilibrium are mainly a consequence of strategic considerations Larger ca
pacities and a higher retail price ensure that a rm has a higher chance to

serve its own contracted demand With a small capacity and low retail prices
a rm risks losing all its prots in those cases where it can no longer meet
its contracted demand
As long as capacities are positive in the market equilibrium  consumers can
always realise their desired consumption level  because blackouts do neither
occur in the duopoly  nor in the monopoly case for any possible demand
shock Thus  social welfare for both cases is given by
W  
Z


U xr     d  zk  
where U xr     is dened in equation  The delivery of electricity
is certain in both cases The higher prices that result in lower consumption
levels and the larger capacities  which only increase the capacity costs without
creating any extra gain from a more certain delivery in the competitive case 
do explain proposition 
Proposition  If the two rms in the duopoly case can always co ordinate
on a subgame perfect equilibrium that is not pareto dominated by any other
equilibrium then the social welfare in the duopoly case is smaller than in the
case with a monopolist for capacity costs that satisfy   z   Social
welfare is the same or smaller for   z 

 
p
 
 and it is the same for
z 

 
p
 

Proof  The statement follows from substituting the relevant consumption
levels xr   into the social welfare function  and from comparing the
social welfare achieved in a monopoly with the one in a competitive equilib
rium
If we take into account all possible competitive equilibria in the duopoly
case  retail prices can also be lower than in the monopoly case It turns
out  however  that social welfare is nearly always lower in the duopoly case
than in the monopoly The reason is that in those equilibria where the retail
prices are lower  the duopoly capacities are so much higher that capacity
costs outweigh the gains of the consumers from higher consumption levels
 Conclusions
Given the multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the competitive
case  it is not easy to derive clear cut conclusions from the analysis here If

we focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria which are not pareto dominated
by other equilibria  then it is not a problem that competitive rms do not
invest enough in generating capacity Their investments together usually
exceed the capacity installed by a monopolist Their retail price is  however 
too high which leads to a lower social welfare than realised in the monopoly
case
Thus  in the case analysed here where consumers cannot respond directly to
electricity prices  but are guaranteed a certain retail price before an uncertain
demand is realised  competition is bad for social welfare This contrasts
with the results in a companion paper Boom    where consumers can
directly respond to electricity price changes and can therefore take part in the
electricity auction There competition is always benecial for social welfare
What drives our results here is the retail price competition where prices
turn out to be relatively high for the installed capacities A large installed
capacity  as well as a high retail price saves a rm from the bad situation in
which it is not able to satisfy the consumers demand with whom it signed a
contract In this situation it would lose all its rents in the wholesale auction
Therefore it would be interesting to consider the same type of model if in case
of an unsatised demand the loss would be less drastic This can be expected
if there would be more than one competitor Another natural extension of
the model considered here is to analyse the eect of a smaller maximum price
in the auction which would punish the competitor  who is not able to meet
his contracted demand  less The analysis of a model with more competitors
and smaller maximum prices are left to further research
Appendix
A The Monopolists Price and Capacity Choice
After integration the monopolists prot function  is
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maximised prot  
m
k

z  is continuous and monotonously decreasing in
z It becomes negative at z  

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B The Nash Equilibrium in Price Bids on the
Wholesale Market
Here it is assumed that total capacities are sucient to satisfy the market
demand k
A
	 k
B
 dr
A
  r
B
   Then  taking into account  each rms
prot function is given by
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If both rms are able to serve their own contracted demand  meaning k
j

d
j
r
j
  r
h
   with j   A B  then both rms want to undercut their rival
because by doing so they avoid being a net payer in the auction  but become
a net receiver of payments Therefore p
j
  p
h
     pp
j
  p
h
   is the unique
Nash equilibrium Substituting this into f
j
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  r
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j
  r
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from lemma  for k
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Suppose now that only rm h can meet its own contracted demand k
h

d
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  r
h
  whereas rm j cannot k
j
 d
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  r
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 Then rm j is always
a net payer and rm h a net receiver in the auction Firm j minimizes
its payments by always undercutting rm h If rm h sets p
h
 p
j
  the
auction price would be pp
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     p
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and its optimal price bid would be
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C The Nash Equilibrium in Retail Prices
If rm j undercuts its rivals retail price  its best response is then
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with   being the smallest unit in which retail prices can be announced
If rm j sets r
j
 r
h
  then it is indierent between all prices that satisfy
this restriction  because its prot  given in   does not depend on the level
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Firm hs best response in retail prices is r
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Now suppose that k
A
  k
B
  k  then each rm has the same best response
in retail prices If k 
q

 
  then both rms best response is given by r
j
r
h

from equation  and the only possible Nash equilibrium is r
A
  r
B
  
If   k 
q

 
  then each rms best response in retail prices is given by
r
j
r
h
  
 



























  max

  k 



if r
h
 max

  k 



 
  r
h
   if max

  k 



 r
h
 r
 r
h
if r
h
  r
 r
h
if r  r
h
 maxf    kg 
 r
h
if maxf    kg  r
h
  

with r from  with k
j
  k
h
  k Then again there is always a Nash
equilibrium with r
A
  r
B
   If k    then there are also multiple Nash
equilibria with r
A
    k and r
B
    k  which result as well in zero
prots for both rms In addition there is always a Nash equilibrium with
r
A
  r
B
  r and positive prots for both rms

D The Nash Equilibrium in Generation Capac
ities
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subgame perfect Nash equilibria described in Proposition 
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Figure  Nash Equilibria in Capacities
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